

KAPOK # 1319

VIA: Air Pouch
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Dispatch No. SGAA-2530

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To : Chief, SE
Attn: ☐
FROM : ☐

Date 5 February 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL- BGFIEND/PARAM
SPECIFIC- BGFIEND Operations, 1952

REFERENCES: OELA-227; SGAA-2112 KAPOK-1249 Attachment #4

1. The attached summary of BGFIEND 1952 operations was written on receipt of VALUABLE's "Appréciation" of their 1952 activities (1st ref.). It is thought that the recapitulation of our 1952 operations (2nd ref.) which Headquarters recently passed to VALUABLE may not be sufficiently detailed.

2. We are forwarding the enclosed attachment to be used as an appendix to our previous report (2nd ref.) and leave it to Headquarters' decision as to whether they wish to pass it along to the VALUABLE representative in Washington.

WFF
WPH/RPB/lgk

Attachment herewith
Summary BGFIEND 1952 Operations

Distribution:
3 - Washington ✓
1 - Washington (Vita 1 Documents File)
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Attachment to SGAA- 2530

1. BGFIEND Objectives, 1952

- a. Continuation of propaganda and P/W efforts
- b. Maintenance of the N.C.F.A.
- c. Reorganization and broadening of the N.C.F.A.
- d. Infiltration of several higher calibre operational teams to establish contacts within the country and to report on the internal situation with a view towards the possibility of defection within military and political circles in the event of a general uprising.

2. BGFIEND Operations, 1952

a. Propaganda and P/W

(1) During the operational year the V.O.F.A. attempted to transmit its program 3 times daily over 2 different frequencies. The one or two days out of every month that they failed to do so were due to factors beyond its control. The main propaganda themes centered around the following topics:

- (a) The failure of the Communist system and the subsequent misery of the Albanian people.
- (b) The exploitation of Albanians by the Soviets.
- (c) The atrocities being committed by the Albanian Communists.
- (d) The growing strength of the anti-Communist feeling toward the West and its manifestations in the Mediterranean area.
- (e) The growing effectiveness of the N.C.F.A. and its operations.
- (f) Demunciation of and warnings to Albanian Communists and pro-liberation instructions to the Albanian people.

(2) The main objectives of the V.O.F.A. have been to give hope to the Albanian people that eventual liberation is certain and to convince the Albanian Communists that they are doomed unless they join the liberation movement spearheaded by the N.C.F.A. The V.O.F.A. attempted to avoid general anti-Communist propaganda but rather concentrated on material relating as directly as possible with conditions and events inside Albania itself. A recent change was effected to satisfy the growing belief that the V.O.F.A. must be integrated as closely as possible with the other operations not only to aid in realizing the aims of those operations but also to avoid premature expectations and actions

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on the part of the Albanian people. Information from teams and reports from monitoring stations confirm that V.O.F.A. was audible within Albania at least a major portion of the year and that it was heard by and made a favorable impression on at least a few Albanians. There is lack of any information to indicate that the V.O.F.A. is heard regularly by a large portion of the relatively small percentage of Albanians owning radios.

(3) In the future the V.O.F.A. expects to be able to continue its progress for improving transmitting facilities by means of changes in antenna design and the use of more powerful transmitters. Its staff hopes to improve the content of its program by directing messages to various social groups within Albania with an aim of causing specific anti-Communist action by that particular group.

(4) Our covert aircraft carried out 12 missions during 1952. During these missions some 3,000,000 leaflets, 2400 cans of food supplies, plus 500 one lb. bags of flour were dropped. The two food supply drops were carried out in January and February of 1952. Since then food drops have been discontinued due to the Radio Tirana accusation that this was an attempt to spread germ warfare.

b. The BGFIEND representative furnished guidance for the N.C.F.A. propaganda activities, supervised publication of Shqipëria, attempted to control our financial support of N.C.F.A. and its Welfare Fund, and maintained close liaison with the VALUABLE representative in dealings with N.C.F.A.

c. Various proposals were submitted for the broadening and reorganization of the N.C.F.A. in an attempt to make it more representative of worthy Albanian elements in exile. These efforts have been suspended for the time being pending further study of the question.

3. Operational missions:

a. Pine Tree Team.

2 members of Pine Tree Team were dropped into the Dibre-Luma area on 19 May 1951. They were reinforced on 9 October 1951 by a 2 man W/T mission which was also dropped into the same area. In October 1951 the team decided to exfiltrate to Yugoslavia due to winter weather and the lack of food and a safe hide out. Pine Tree Team remained in Yugoslavia until the 28th of June 1952 when they returned to Greece. While in Albania Pine succeeded in making useful contacts to whom they distributed arms for caching which they received during 4 resupply drops. A total of 59 containers weighing approximately 3000 lbs. were dropped to this team. W/T contact was maintained with base during the short interval the operator remained within the country.

b. Willow Tree Team

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b. Willow Tree Team

A 4 man Willow Tree Team attempted to infiltrate during January 1952 but was forced back by adverse weather conditions. A reorganized Willow Team made 3 successful trips to the Korca area during the summer months. The first infiltrated over land on 14 June and returned to Greece the 9th of July. They then re-entered on the 25th of August to return the 12th of September. The last trip was from the 16th to the 27th of October. Willow's primary mission was the establishment of a series of dead letter drops to which sub-agents recruited could deliver intelligence on the local reaction to our P/W efforts. A certain amount of P/W and operational intelligence was acquired through Willow's efforts and we anticipate greater results next year.

c. Fig Tree Team

A 5 man Fig Tree Team was infiltrated over land on 3 October for a mission to Korçe-Pogradec area where they were to establish a permanent W/T base. Although regular W/T contact was maintained with the team throughout their mission, they exfiltrated to Greece on 13 November having failed to find a suitable location for a permanent base. Fig is being held for operations in the spring of 1953.

This team was able to make useful contacts in its operational area which will be exploited next season. These included persons willing to take up overt action in the event of a general uprising. Among the information acquired by Fig during its mission was the report that a team of Sigurimi agent provocateurs had been operating in the Korçe area. This was of particular interest as it was the first report we have had of the Sigurimi using these tactics.

4. In general the following briefing was given BGFIEND teams:

- a. To explore the possibilities of defection of prominent individuals or large scale groups within military and political circles who could be counted on in the event of a revolution.
- b. To establish resistance networks and reliable supporters who could be depended upon at a later date.
- c. To bring or send out specific intelligence.
- d. To assess the feeling of the general public towards revolution and change of regime.
- e. Spread favorable propaganda for the N.C.F.A. and assess the results of the V.O.F.A. broadcasting program.

5. We feel the

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5. We feel the results of our 1952 operations were not disappointing. As our agents were carefully chosen and were of higher mental calibre than we had been able to recruit previously, they succeeded in establishing good contacts and sent or brought out useful information. Their experiences have been extremely helpful in the planning of future operations and the conducting of our P/W efforts. The teams were all of the opinion that the majority of the population was definitely anti-Communist and would welcome an overthrow of the present regime. However, they are most reluctant for fear of reprisals, to openly support any such movement until they are definitely assured of outside help in such form that the success of such a movement is unquestionable. They feel that this support must come, at least indirectly, from the Western Powers.

It was not possible to make the necessary contacts to establish anything definite regarding important military or political defections. All reports indicate that the economic plight of the people is constantly growing worse, the food situation is one of the most difficult problems which faces our teams and had it not been for our special concentrated food rations they stated that they would have been unable to safely reach their operational area.

We had no reports on a split between Shehu and Hoxha. This would seem to be Communist propaganda, as our teams and border exfiltrates made no special mention of it.

6. Conclusions:

a. Although information was not forthcoming on defections nor were permanent W/T bases established, we feel that we have carried out parts a., b., and d. of section 1, our 1952 objectives. Intelligence reporting was not the primary purpose of part d. Such intelligence as we were able to gather was purely a secondary part of these operations.

b. Useful contacts were established, arms and supplies were distributed and initial steps were taken in the establishment of resistance networks. W/T liaison was maintained and successful resupply and body drops were carried out. No casualties or arrests were suffered by BGFIEND team members during the 1952 operational season.

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